International Gramsci Journal
Volume 3
Issue 4 Gramsci und Benjamin – Passagen:
Gramsci and Benjamin – Bridges / Reviews

Article 14

2020

Past and Present, Subalternity and Revolution
Gianmarco Fifi

Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/gramsci

Recommended Citation
Fifi, Gianmarco, Past and Present, Subalternity and Revolution, International Gramsci Journal,
3(4), 2020, 169-184.
Available at:https://ro.uow.edu.au/gramsci/vol3/iss4/14
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au

Past and Present, Subalternity and Revolution
Abstract
This is a review by Gianmarco Fifi of the volume Revisiting Gramsci’s Notebooks (Leiden: Brill, 2020) that
includes the proceedings of an international conference (“Past and Present”) held in London in 2017. The
volume was edited by edited by Francesca Antonini, Aaron Bernstein, Lorenzo Fusaro and Robert
Jackson.

Keywords
Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, subalterns, hegemony, passive revolution

This journal article is available in International Gramsci Journal: https://ro.uow.edu.au/gramsci/vol3/iss4/14

Past and Present, Subalternity and Revolution
Gianmarco Fifi
1. Introduction
The collection Revisiting Gramsci’s Notebooks (Leiden: Brill, 2020)
edited by Francesca Antonini, Aaron Bernstein, Lorenzo Fusaro
and Robert Jackson includes contributions from some of the most
esteemed Gramscian scholars worldwide. The volume is composed
of eight parts, divided by themes, for a total of 25 chapters. More
so than any other edited volume, this book originates from years of
engagement with Gramsci’s oeuvre and with the possible application
of his thought to contemporary issues. In fact, all contributions
spring from (and relate to) the long-term study and employment of
Gramsci’s thought by the different authors. There is thus no doubt
that the essays contained in this volume will provoke extended
debates among Gramscian scholars in the years to come.
As a testament to the incredible reach and breadth of Gramsci’s
intellectual achievements, the variety of contributions included in
the volume is extremely vast and could interest scholars involved in
almost all fields of social sciences. A brief account of the themes
analysed is in order. The first section is entitled Global Gramsci:
Gramscian Geographies and describes Gramsci as a geographical
thinker (Loftus), while also developing specific case studies in the
political economy of Egypt (Roccu) and Thailand (Buddharaksa).
Language and Translation emphasizes the contribution of the Italian
thinker in the study of language also connecting these reflections to
key political underpinnings (Boothman and Sućeska), whilst
Wróblewska provides an interesting analysis of Gramsci’s texts
employing his own approach to translatability. The section Gramsci
and the Marxian Legacy digs deep into the relation between Gramsci
and Marxism (and Marx more specifically), in order to address the
theme of revolution (Frosini), the originality of the philosophy of
praxis (Bernstein) and the use of historical analogy (Antonini).
Subalternity between Pre-Modernity and Modernity provides new insights
regarding Gramsci’s concept of subalternity (Thomas and
Freeland), whilst also applying it to contemporary issues of space
and migration (Meret). The theme of subalternity also permeates
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the fifth section (Postcolonial and Anthropological Approaches) and is
used to reinterpret Gramsci’s Southern Question (Conelli) as well as
Edward Said Orientalism (Vandeviver), while Ciavolella emphasizes
the role of anthropology in Gramsci’s development of the idea of
‘popular politics’. The sixth part, Culture, Ideology, Religion touches
upon different themes, from Gramsci’s approach towards the
Catholic Church (Chino), to his interest in literature (PohnLauggas), to the analysis of the concept of the ‘mummification of
culture’ as used in the Prison Notebooks (Jackson). Historical Capitalism
and World History, uncovers Gramsci’s thought in regards to key
events in political economy: the passage from feudalism to
capitalism (Douet), Fordism (Settis) and, more generally, to the role
of the state in international relations (Fusaro). The last section,
Readings of Gramsci, deals with different interpretations of Gramsci
that have been offered in the 20th century in Italy (Panichi), France
(Crézégut and Neubauer) and Latin America (Cuppi).
As a whole, the collection speaks to the liveliness of Gramsci’s
thought as well as to the extended variety of applications that it can
have in helping us understanding our own present. As argued by
Anne Showstack Sassoon in the foreword, “Gramsci invites us to
work with the material to understand better the difficult questions
of our own times and to seek innovative responses” (p. xii). In this
sense, the theme selected as a guideline for the collection, “past and
present”, is extremely apt and summarizes more broadly the ways in
which we should approach a thinker such as Gramsci, always
reflecting on how he can help us better understand the present and
act in it. In terms of methodology, the volume is valuable for the
reliance that all authors show on the original texts, particularly
coming from the Prison Notebooks but also from the letters and from
the pre-prison writings. In this sense, to be extremely appreciated is
the deep familiarity with Gramsci’s writings that all authors display,
even when working on specific empirical cases (see, for example,
the chapters written by Roberto Roccu, Susi Meret and Lorenzo
Fusaro).
A complete critical account of such a vast and nuanced array of
projects would require much more space than the one that I
possess here. In addition, a task that would be very much worth
undertaking, but which can find no substantial space in this essay
review is to integrate the chapters included in the volume within the
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analysis of the long-term engagement of the authors with Gramsci’s
thought. For reasons of space, here much more selectivity will be
needed. I shall argue that one of the key contributions of the
collection as a whole is to point to Gramsci’s continuous struggle to
lift people out of subalternity. This is obviously more explicit in
certain essays than in others. Yet, a key feature of the whole value is
that the authors emphasize, even when treating the aspects of
Gramsci’s thought that are not strictly related to political struggles,
the ways in which the Italian thinker was always concerned about
the possibility of future emancipation. Although this is a recognized
feature of Gramsci’s thought, the ways in which the authors
develop this argument at various points in the collection is
particularly original and thought-provoking and could be of interest
for scholars working on broader fields within Marxism and critical
theory. In particular, the authors seem to repeatedly stress the fact
that the need for the subaltern groups to free themselves is not only
a normative stance, but also crucially one that has to do with the
understanding of the social world. In fact, they highlight not only
the need to build a collective project capable of lifting people out of
subalternity, but in turn identify the absence of such a project as the
main reason for capitalist continuity. However, in the second
section, I draw attention to how within the collection one finds at
least as many instances in which the authors seem to contradict the
previous insights. The lack of a more coherent theorization, I shall
argue, also explains some of the discrepancies that can be found
between theoretical accounts and their application to empirical
cases. Thirdly, I will briefly refer to a possible way out of such
conundrum by relying on some of the insights that the authors give
in their contributions, but which seem to be still under-developed
both in this collection and in Gramscian scholarship more broadly.
2. The present we have created: on Gramsci revolutionary thought
Among the central features of the collection is the
acknowledgement that Gramsci’s thought is mainly concerned with
the creation of a revolutionary project. This is true not only for the
sections of his thought that deal with the need to create what he
calls a Modern Prince, but actually permeates all sides of his
theoretical elaboration, as well emphasized by all the contributions
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in the volume. Fabio Frosini (p. 125) evocatively argues that “for
Gramsci ‘past’ and ‘present’ coincide respectively with ‘history’ and
‘politics’” and, going into further detail, he observes that the
present is supposed to represent the criticism and supersession of
the past. In Gramsci’s own words, “we must be more adherent to
the present, which we ourselves have contributed to creating,
having consciousness of the past and its continuation (and
reliving)” (Q1§156, p. 136 [cf. PN Vol. 1, p. 234]: cited on p. 133).1
Implicitly or explicitly following such an approach, practically all
contributions focus their attention on the ways in which Gramsci’s
thought invites the subaltern classes to develop alternative forms of
society. Alex Loftus, for example, focusses a non-determinist
reading of Gramsci’s approach to geography (p. 12). In his words,
Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis pays attention to the ways in which
“social groups make histories and geographies, albeit not under
conditions of their own choosing” (p. 21). This ultimately pushes us
to explore, for example, “the manner in which the transformation
of the city-country relationship might become part of the struggle
for communist hegemony” (p. 13). Susi Meret, perhaps with an
overstatement, argues that Gramsci “was the first to show interest
in the way the subaltern classes had organized throughout history in
the fight to emancipate themselves from their oppressors” (p. 210).
She insists that his “political and social experiences prompted him
to study how networks of solidarity and autonomy can generate
locally and eventually spark transversal alliances between groups of
subalterns with a collective aim: to transform society” (p. 210).
Francesca Antonini, in the chapter that – together with the one
written by Ingo Pohn-Lauggas – more explicitly focuses on the
relation between past and present, reminds us that the use of
historical analogy itself in Gramsci “is essential to […] intervene
successfully in the political dynamic” (p. 164). The reference to
Gramsci’s continuous interest in the building of a revolutionary
project is clear also when the authors engage with parts of his
thought that are not necessarily linked to political processes. Alen
Sućeska, for example, acknowledges that Gramsci’s thought about
language not as a linguist but as a revolutionary (p. 82). Similarly,
1 References to the Prison Notebooks are made according to notebook number (Q), number of
note (§) and page as in the Italian critical edition. All translations from the Prison Notebooks are
my own.
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Derek Boothman reminds us that ideology and language are a
central part of the creation of collective subjectivities and,
ultimately, of history itself (p. 67). All these accounts speak to the
centrality of revolutionary political organizations within Gramsci’s
thought. As synthesized by Meret, “[t]he unification of the
struggles, class solidarity and alliances are central themes in
Gramsci’s writings from the early years of his political activism” (p.
211). This is not necessarily a novel feature within Gramscian
scholarship (see Frosini 2010, Ives 2004 and Thomas 2009). Yet,
given the centrality that it assumes within the collection as well as
the way in which it is developed, it can definitely be thoughtprovoking and perhaps of interest also for scholars working on
broader fields of Marxism and critical theory.
In particular, and here comes the most original aspect, at various
points the authors highlight not only the need to build a collective
project capable of lifting people out of subalternity; but in turn
identify the absence of such a project as the main reason for
capitalist continuity. In other words, Gramsci’s revolutionary
commitment is not only framed as a normative statement, but most
crucially as an ontological one. As argued by Nicolas Vandeviver:
“It is clear from Gramsci’s writings that conscious and wilful
actions of men are, after all, the prime motors of history” (p. 259).
Similarly, Riccardo Ciavolella (p. 267) places great emphasis on the
need for the subaltern classes to become hegemonic and to fight
those tendencies that bring them to self-defeat (fragmentation, lack
of cohesive project, passivity, spontaneity). Building on such
intuition, Takahiro Chino (p. 292) highlights the role of common
sense as a limited form of thought that must be overcome by good
sense. This ultimately shows not only how a collective subject is a
necessary pre-requisite of thorough societal change, but also how
the lack of such unitary project tends to facilitate capitalist
continuity.
Lorenzo Fusaro, though stressing the role that Marx’s laws play
within the Prison Notebooks, rightly insists that:
What Gramsci seems to elaborate throughout the Prison Notebooks is Marx’s
idea that epochal change has the potential to occur within the structure only in
cases in which “men become conscious of this conflict”. By implication, a lack
in the acquisition of consciousness that occurs at the level of ideologies (hence
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Gramsci’s interest in ideology, intellectuals, etc.) changes, to put it crudely,
absolutely nothing. (p. 364)

Fusaro also adds that, differently from Giovanni Arrighi,
Gramsci believed that hegemony was a precondition for
domination and not vice versa, and that “once political power has
been grasped and hence domination attained, the exercise of
leadership continues to be a condition for its maintenance” (p. 365).
Perhaps, the most insightful chapter in the collection when it comes
to the theorization and empirical application of such insights is
Meret’s study of the refugee-led group Lampedusa in Hamburg
(LiHH).2 Stressing the fundamental role that consciousness and
unity play not only in changing subalterns’ condition, but also in
producing historical change, she writes:
The “degree” of subalternity depends […] on the transformative potential
and level of “consciousness” experienced by the subalterns through the diverse
phases of their life experiences. Political subjectivation involves individual and
collective self-awareness, education, emancipation, political consciousness, selforganisation, action, and, in particular, it requires the motivation and ability to
act collectively. The struggle for emancipation can be seen as a radical and
transformative process, starting from individual awareness and eventually
developing into collective political acts of antagonism and autonomy (p. 211).

This is not a mere normative stance, but it is rather part of the
realization that, “[f]or Gramsci, the only way to achieve social change was
by encouraging and supporting an intellectually autonomous,
educated, self-empowered, strong and cohesive working class
movement” (p. 215; my emphasis).
The contribution that such insights could have within both
Gramscian and Marxist debates should not be underestimated. In
fact, whilst we have assisted in recent years to a proliferation of
debates that place the emphasis on coercive or economic
mechanisms as the ultimate explanatory tool to understand changes
and stability within capitalism (see, for example, Bonefeld 2017,
Bruff 2014, Harvey 2005 and Streek 2017), the authors seem to
point towards a rather different direction. The coercive aspects
2 The LiHH is a movement created in 2013 in Hamburg, by refugees who had escaped wartorn Libya. Their main claims were the right to stay, educate themselves, work and be able to
freely move within the European Union.
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linked to capitalist development and ruling classes’ dominance are
not negated; yet, they are often linked to the relative weakness and
fragmentation of popular classes. At various points, the collection
seems to emphasize how the use of force is interpreted in Gramsci
as something that is rendered possible by hegemony and consent,
and thus is always potentially contestable. Crucial in this regard
appears Peter Thomas’ contribution to the understanding of
subalterns as “unable, qua subaltern social groups, to assume the
self-directive and directing capacities embodied in the form of the
political” (p. 188). As Gramsci argues, “the subaltern classes, by
definition, are not unified and cannot unify themselves until they
become the ‘state’” (Q25§5, p. 2288 [cf. SPN p. 52]: cited on p.
188). Thomas is even more explicit as he writes that:
Were there no degrees of subalternity, were civil society a terrain of total
domination rather than a continually renewed hegemonic relation of
subordination, hegemony, as the emergence of capacities for self-direction and
leadership of previously subaltern social groups, would not be a realistic
political strategy (p. 190).

Subalternity is thus understood as a deeply dialectical relation,
not imposed coercively on the weaker sections of the population,
but rather as a key element, that itself sustain ruling classes’
dominance and, in turn, makes it potentially fragile. This implies
that the absence of organized revolutionary stances can be seen as
the primary reason for capitalist continuity; and one that in turn
allows the use of coercive mechanisms to counter fragmented and
episodic resistance.
In sum, the authors seem to recognize something that is often
underappreciated by contemporary critical scholars, that is that the
position of subalternity should not be understood as a mere result
of capitalist accumulation and coercive apparatuses; but rather as a
pre-requisite that renders these forms of domination possible and
therefore deeply contestable. As I will show in the next section,
however, this element – though often stressed – almost never leads
to a coherent formulation of Gramsci’s theory of changes and
stability within capitalism. This lack of elaboration can also explain
why one finds at least as many instances in which the authors seem
to contradict the previous insights.
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3. ‘We good subalterns’: between ‘positive alterity’ and ‘absolute exteriority’?3
As we have seen, the Gramsci that comes out at various points in
the collection is a thinker that not only emphasizes the need to
build alternative hegemonic projects in order to seize the state and
produce revolutionary stances; but, conversely, understands the lack
of such organic projects (in the forms of subalternity, passivity,
common sense, etc.) as the central reason that allows capital’s
continuity. This approach is of the upmost importance, given the
current proliferation of studies within critical theory that tend to
emphasize coercive mechanisms as key features that at various
levels impede change to emerge.
This novel aspect, however, is counter-balanced by several
instances in which the authors appear to slide away from the
previous theoretical insights. The passage between common sense
and good sense, for example, is understood as crucial in Sućeska’s
chapter in order to contest ruling hegemony. In fact, he is extremely
precise in identifying the riddle that Gramsci attempts to solve, as
he points out that whilst the subalterns’ “unification would be the
beginning of the end of their subalternity, they uphold a form of
consciousness which is in contradiction with those social facts and,
what is perhaps most significant, they appear to do so willingly” (p.
90). Yet, in expressing the reasons that maintain common sense as
well as “a dominant mode of thought among the masses” (p. 90),
he mentions “the institutions of the hegemonic apparatus + the
practices of traditional intellectuals” (p. 92). Sućeska argues that
“[t]his is a much more ‘productive’ conception compared to that of
‘false consciousness’, both in the theoretical and the political sense,
as it both directs us towards revolutionary potential in the masses,
and, at the same time, allows us to understand how such potential is
being repressed” (p. 92; my emphasis). In pointing out the ways in
which social change is always potentially stifled, Sućeska ultimately
undermines his own remark on the role played by the passive
attitude of the subordinated classes in accepting external forms of
consciousness (p. 91).
To put it bluntly, if the hegemonic apparatus and traditional
intellectuals are always capable of repressing masses potential, it is

3 Some of the arguments presented in this and the next section have been more thoroughly
developed in regards to the wider neo-Gramscian literature in Fifi 2019.
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not true that the unification of subordinated classes would be “the
beginning of the end of their subalternity”. More in general, what
appears to be missing is a theory that connects social reproduction
with people’s lack of organization and theoretical coherence. Anne
Freeland seems to remark on this point perfectly, as she discusses
subaltern studies:
Along with the notion that subaltern studies exaggerates the capacity for
autonomy on the part of subaltern groups, there is, and for related reasons,
although in reference to its later period, a more common, opposite contention
that subaltern studies goes too far in denying subaltern agency. The link
between the two tendencies lies in the separation of subalternity from the hegemonic
order, first as a positive alterity, and then as an absolute exteriority silenced by its
discursive incommensurability and therefore conceivable only in negative
terms […] (p. 201; my emphasis).

This formulation is of crucial value, as it points to the fallacy of
thinking subalterns’ praxis as fundamentally disjointed from ruling
bloc’s hegemony. Separating the two processes, as some authors
seem to do, leaves us without a theory that can link capitalist
development and continuity with its potentially contested nature.
The exact note on which Sućeska’s chapter rely most heavily
(Q11§12) can in fact be used to discredit his approach. Gramsci
argues that the ‘contrast between thought and action’ of a certain
social group signifies that the social group in question acts only
partially as an organic totality, while often passively follows
conceptions that are not its own (Q11§12, p. 1378-9; SPN p. 326).
He also insists that the idea that ‘every man is a philosopher’ must
lead us towards a
second moment, the moment of critique and consciousness, hence to
the question: is it preferable to ‘think’ without having critical
consciousness, in a disjointed and occasional manner, thus to
“participate” in a conception of the world mechanically “imposed” by
the external environment, […] or is it preferable to elaborate one’s own
conception of the world consciously and critically and thus, in
connection with such working of one’s own brain, choose one’s own
sphere of activity, actively participate in the production of the history of
the world, being one’s own guide and not passively and supinely accept
from the outside the imprint to one’s own personality? (Q11§12, pp.
1375-6; SPN pp. 323-4)
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Gramsci here explicitly links uncritical consciousness with the
‘imposition’ of external ideas and practices. This, in turn, highlights
how the development of a critical collective project also equates to
a challenge to oppressive structures and to the active participation
in the “production of the history of the world”. On the contrary, if
the passage from common sense to good sense is always potentially
impeded by coercion, the critical/uncritical thinking of the
subalterns would play little role in determining their emancipation.
The same ambivalence that we find in Sućeska, can also be
detected in Robert Jackson’s chapter. Discussing what he calls the
“mummification of culture” – hence “the embalming process
through which cultural formations that are valuable and appropriate
when created become fossilized and anachronistic when repeated in
new conditions”(p. 313) – Jackson emphasizes that this is the result
of a double movement. On the one hand, “mummification from
above” coinciding with the attempts of the ruling classes to
“interrupt any development towards coherence of the traces of
autonomous action by the subaltern groups” (p. 313). On the other
hand, “mummification from below”, which “manifests itself in the
‘intellectual laziness’ that Gramsci connects with the phenomenon
of ‘Lorianism’, the ‘lack of critical spirit’ that characterizes certain
intellectuals who rely on a quasi-scientific sociology” (p. 313).
Jackson is very precise in identifying mummification as reappearing
in different forms, but crucially as part of the same phenomenon
(pp. 319-331): the conformism associated with Americanism,
Taylorism and Fordism, bureaucratic tendencies, Italian cultural
developments and the Catholic Church’s conservatism, only to
name a few. He also gives a very balanced account of how
mummification asserts itself historically:
One conditions the other: the ‘mental laziness’ of Lorianism has been
fomented by the dispersion wrought by the dominant groups, while the
mummification of culture is able to achieve purchase on the life of the nation
for as long as the subaltern groups are unable to develop a more coherent
leadership (p. 332).

Elsewhere, however, he seems to treat mummification from
above and mummification from below as if they were separate
phenomena. This is testified by the fact that Jackson adds that the
former “forms a part of the complex puzzle by which the dominant

178

International Gramsci Journal No. 12 (2nd Series / Seconda Serie) Summer / Estate 2020

social forces are able to obstruct the healthy development of new
historical and political initiatives” (p. 332). Conversely, “demummification of culture is a condition for the healthy
development of historical initiative, described by Gramsci in terms
of a cathartic movement. In this process, the subaltern groups pass
from their position as an ‘object’ in history to become a
protagonist, or the authors of a new historical epoch” (p. 333).
Framing the issue in these terms, Jackson provides us with no clear
theory regarding the ways in which mummification from below
(that is passivity, common sense etc.) is connected to the possibility
of the ruling classes to reproduce mummified forms from above
(e.g. bureaucracy). In fact, to use Freeland’s terminology, subaltern
groups are first seen as ‘absolute exteriority’ that, even when
organized to produce healthy social developments, can always be
obstructed by dominant social forces. In the second instance, they
are conceptualized as a “positive alterity” that can magically go
from having no agency to being the “authors of a new historical
epoch”.
The way out of this impasse, once again, can be found in
Gramsci, and particularly in his understanding of bureaucracy as
always dependent on the passivity or lack of cultural elaboration of
the base. In fact, he criticizes the very dualism that does not
recognize the connection between the individual and the sociopolitical organisms she is part of. In Gramsci’s words:
One is brought to think the relations between the individual and the
organism as a dualism, and to an external critical attitude of the individual
towards the organism (when the attitude is not of a-critical enthusiastic
admiration). In any case, a fetishistic relation. The individual waits that the
organism acts, even if she does not operate and does not reflect about the fact
that, being her attitude very widespread, the organism is necessarily inactive.
Furthermore, it is to be recognized that, being widespread a deterministic and
mechanistic conception of history (conception that is of common sense and is
linked to the passivity of the great popular masses), every individual, seeing
that, despite her lack of intervention, something still happens, she is brought to
think that in fact above the individuals it exists a phantasmagorical entity, the
abstraction of the collective organism, a kind of autonomous divinity, that does
not think with any concrete brain, but still thinks, that does not move with
determinate human legs, but still moves, etc. (Q15§13, p. 1770; cf. SPN p. 187,
n. 83)
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Gramsci does not negate the existence of bureaucracy, he rather
negates the possibility that bureaucracy (or mummified
organizations, to use Jackson’s language) can be kept in place by the
ruling bloc, without the cooperation of the subaltern groups. His
message seems to be that it is only by seeing the seeds of
mummification in the everyday shortcomings of potentially
transformative agency, that we can conceptualize the potentiality
for resistance and emancipation.
Jackson’s chapter provides us with great insights on the relation
between people’s everyday praxis and capital’s continuity. Yet, these
are ultimately neutralized by his references to the ways in which the
emancipatory struggles are impeded by forms of oppression from
above. This ambiguity, which runs through the majority of the
collection, I think, also explains the discrepancies between
theoretical accounts and empirical applications of Gramsci’s
thought.
4. A Gramscian moment in IPE?
As emphasized in the previous section, the relation between the
need for the subalterns to seek emancipation and the possibility of
the ruling classes to resist them, although certainly present, remains
underdeveloped throughout the collection. Perhaps as a
consequence of this, applications of Gramsci’s thought to
international political economy seem at times to contradict the
fruitful insights analysed in section 2. For example, Watcharabon
Buddharaksa refers to the dialectical relation between the “coercive
practices” of the political society and the hegemony present within
what Gramsci calls “civil society” (p. 58). Yet, the empirical analysis
that he puts forward does not really elaborate on how we should
understand such relation. It is, in fact, surprising that the
overwhelming reference to coercive mechanisms of the Thai state
that we find within the chapter is coupled with the recognition that
“the alternative/critical/challenging social forces which have been
growing, are still neither mature nor critical enough to contest the
traditional mode of thought/conception of the world; they are also
not sufficient to construct a whole new democratic historical bloc
at this historical stage” (p. 59-60).
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The fact that hegemony is always working behind dominance
could have also been more coherently integrated in Fusaro’s
account on the world order. In his conclusion, in fact, he argues
that US international hegemony was developed already in the interwar period “with the qualification that the latter form of hegemony
was deficient: while backed by the state strictu sensu, hegemony was
exercised via private channels rather than public ones and took
mainly an economic dimension” (p. 372). In more general terms, he
adds: “As a result of the ‘endless accumulation of capital’ and
capital’s drive to expand beyond its borders, nation-states are
compelled to become hegemonic in order to secure the
accumulation and reproduction of ‘their’ capitals” (p. 373). It is
clear that, in contrast with what Fusaro himself argued against
Arrighi, the hegemonic process is here seen only as inserted within
the process of capital accumulation, in this sense leaving
unexplored the manners in which capitalism can be contested, let
alone the relation between capitalist development and its potentially
contested nature.
Similar considerations could be applied to Roberto Roccu’s
chapter. He presents two alternative theories that can explain the
politics of neoliberalism in general, and then test their validity in
reference to the neoliberalization process in Egypt. On the one
hand, Gramsci’s notion of “passive revolution” depends on “a
dominant class that fails to be hegemonic and subaltern classes that
lack ‘the degree of homogeneity, self-awareness and organization’
required for successfully challenging the dominant classes” (p.28).
On the other hand, and this is the notion that Roccu believes best
fits the Egyptian case (even though an in-depth theorization is not
provided in the chapter), “counterrevolution” (or counterreformation, in Gramscian terms) represents a “revolution against
the revolution” (p. 41). Leaving aside the cogency of such concepts
to describe recent Egyptian history, the distinction between
“passive revolution” and “counterrevolution”, thus conceptualized,
is emblematic from the standpoint of Marxist and Gramscian
scholarship. In fact, while the former describes a situation, in which
oppositional and ruling groups are equally weak, the latter describes
a scenario in which they are both strong and organized. This
negates the idea that the position of the ruling classes are
dialectically related to that of the subaltern ones. In other words,
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the weakness of potentially opposing forces is not conceptualized
as reinforcing the ruling bloc. And, conversely, the increasing
organization and cohesiveness of the subalterns does not
necessarily mean a weakening of the ruling classes’ potential to
respond to them. Connected to this, Roccu seems to imply that in
both cases the ruling classes have at their disposal the possibility to
“render the subaltern classes ‘passive’” (p. 29) or to counter their
upheaval. Very telling is the fact that in both Fusaro’s and Roccu’s
chapters – despite the theoretical references to the role of consent
(p. 370) and the lack of self-awareness of the subaltern classes (p.
28) – the empirical analyses of the world order and the Egyptian
case hardly ever refer to the strengths and weaknesses of subaltern
classes and potentially opposing groups.4
5. On (passive) revolution
As I have highlighted in this review, the collection convincingly
puts forward a discussion on Gramsci’s revolutionary thought,
pointing out how this is mainly concerned with the emancipation of
the subaltern groups. In addition, and in a very original manner, the
occasional and disorganized consciousness of subordinated classes
is often seen as something that can end up producing their passivity
and ultimately lead them to defeat. Yet, at least as frequent seems
the appeal to arguments that reject such a position, highlighting
ruling classes’ impositions as the ultimate explanatory tool for
capitalist continuity. I have argued that while the former approach
could represent a very timely contribution to Gramscian and
Marxist debates, the latter leads us towards an ambiguous theory of
socio-historical change that deeply contrasts with Gramsci’s own
position. One is reminded of the concept of passive revolution,
which in Gramsci’s words, “presupposes, and indeed postulates as
necessary, a vigorous antithesis which can present intransigently all
its potentiality for development” (Q15§62, p. 1827; cf. SPN p.
114).5 Digging deeper in Gramsci’s categories, we could argue that
the coerciveness of capital restructuring would not be possible if it

4 An exception being a very brief remark in Roccu’s chapter (p. 37).
5 For a more thorough engagement with Gramsci’s notion of passive revolution, see Fifi 2019.
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was not for the fragmentation (being that cultural or organizational)
of potentially revolutionary social groups.
Some of the aspects of the collection that point in the direction
of dialectically relating subaltern passivity with ruling classes’
dominance, I believe, could thus be further emphasized and
perhaps should lead wider scholarship on Marxism to a rethinking
of key conceptual and analytical categories. In particular, more
empirical attention should be directed towards the specific ways in
which the subaltern classes (through their passivity, common sense,
etc.) tend to reinforce and make possible ruling class’ hegemony. In
this sense, Meret’s chapter offers the richest insights in the whole
volume. She uses a framework borrowed by Gramsci’s reflection on
the role of the factory councils to understand both the strengths
and the weaknesses of the refugee-led group Lampedusa in Hamburg
(LiHH). Perhaps a good idea would be to extend some of the
questions Meret poses in regards to refugees’ struggles to wider
enquiries concerning subordinated classes: How can the emergence
of movements/parties/groups be explained? What are their claims
and demands? What are their patterns of subjectivization, alliance
formation, solidarity and community building? How, lastly, can they
be supported and encouraged? (p. 212). This in turn would also
provide critical scholars with a better understanding of the relation
between the strengths and weaknesses of potentially opposing
groups and the ability of the ruling bloc to respond and subjugate
the subalterns.6
In conclusion, Gramsci’s writings dispute the view according to
which, as eloquently synthesized by Vandeviver,
[p]ower is seen as nomothetic, unstoppable in the growth of its domination
and ultimately irresistible because it exhausts all human activity, dismisses
individual human agency, and empties out resistance as well as the production
of counter-discursive knowledge (p. 249).

For this reason, Gramsci’s oeuvre should be explored also, if not
mainly, in order to identify those forms of praxis that end up
reinforcing capitalist domination and, conversely, those that can
produce forms of emancipation for the subalterns. Whilst the
6 Attempts to apply a Gramscian framework to such studies, can be found for example in Cox
2018 and Green 2015.
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collection, as well as the long-term engagement of the authors with
Gramsci’s thought, provides good insights on the ways to approach
such riddle; the need for a more universal theory seems to be as
crucial as ever.
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